In this paper I present the concept of hope as a human driving force aimed at a better future, in accordance with and on the basis of the thought of the German philosopher Ernst Bloch, with reference to Albert Camus' notion of the absurd.
expectations and delusions; second, hope was added to all humanity's evils in order to counterbalance them.
In this context, Ernst Bloch maintains that even unfounded hope cannot be counted among the evils of this world. 1 He understands the hope left trapped in the jar, after all the evils had escaped, as the only good thing left. Hope preserves human beings' capacity to strive at good things that are not currently present. "Hope," Bloch writes, "is the good thing that remains for men, which has in no way already ripened but which has also in no way been destroyed." 2 Bloch is a process philosopher. Process philosophy regards reality as a process or a series of processes, in contrast to the philosophy that sees the world as something completed or unalterable, static. However, he asks to be distinguished from the traditionally labeled process philosophers (e.g. Aristotle and Hegel) as well, claiming that their philosophies are infected by anamnesis. For Bloch, this term denotes two tendencies. The first is the tendency to limit knowledge to what is already present. The second is the tendency to ascribe to the actual forms and contents of the world a metaphysical starting-point, which contains these very forms and contents as a potential, as if all of the forms and contents of the world were predetermined, while the historical process moves them from potentiality into actuality. As he sees it, the process philosophyuntil Marx -does not entail a true concept of the new, a truly new future 3 . According to Bloch, one should divorce oneself from the anamnesiac trends and develop a new philosophy aiming at a new future. Bloch calls this new philosophy an open system 4 , since were reality completely "solid" it would have been impossible for anything to move or occur. The basic assumption of this view holds that the external reality -as well as the internal-mental reality of the individual -is not closed and complete 5 ; the given world is not real since it has yet to fulfill its reality, and is incomplete since it has yet to materialize all of its possibilities. The world, according to Bloch, is going through a process and is not yet concluded; both the world and man are accordingly understood as the not-yet (nochnicht) 6 . In order to clarify this view it should be remarked that Bloch takes Matter -not only the consciousness and its workings -as implemented with Utopia, as something whose essences may still change and take shape. The reality or the matter are not taken to be closed and non-developing, but rather moving, altering and becoming throughout history, via the mediation of the consciousness. The open system is based on the principle of hope, insofar as it functions in Bloch as a guiding principle of both subjective reality and objective reality.
In this context, Bloch distinguishes between subjective hope (Hoping Hope) and objective hope (Hoped Hope) 7 . The aim of the process, as subjective hope, has already been determined; it appears as the only unchanging thing in history: happiness, freedom, authenticity. Therefore it is confident of itself, whereas objective hope -had it already been confident of itself, it would have no longer been hope. The fulfillment of the object of the objective hope in the world is still not assured, since if it were, the self-assurance of the subjective hope would have been a triviality and would certainly not display courage 8 . For example, it would be ridiculous to hope that 2+3=5. It does not make any sense to hope for something which is guaranteed, just as it is ridiculous to express hope for something that has already occurred and is known to us.
In other words, hope can be based only on militant optimism which acknowledges that the process encapsulates not only the possibility of success, but also the possibility of danger or destruction; for in itself, objectively, whatever is possible can happen as well as not happen 9 . Bloch discusses the category of possibility as a result of the need to overcome the gap between the static thought and the thought of the new (Novum) and the open. For this it was required of him to rethink the traditional concept of possibility in the history of philosophy. He aspires to widen the application span of the possible; if, traditionally, the concept of possibility was limited to the epistemic sphere, Bloch asks to apply it mainly to the ontological sphere, since it should be kept in mind that as a Marxist, he aims at changing the world no less than to interpret it, and therefore has no interest in inquiring into epistemic possibility by itself, but also to inquire into the possibility of matter itself. Bloch shifts the metaphysical emphasis from problems relating to perception onto problems which involve the being itself. He establishes a new ontological category, the Not-Yet-Being (Noch-Nicht-Sein). It is distinguished from traditional metaphysics by assuming a being that is evolving, open, and not predetermined. The given world, Bloch claims, is laden with realities whose ontological status can be understood as Not-Yet-Being. According to him, these possibilities have some measure of existence, even though they have yet to attain full actuality.
The philosophy Bloch is establishing is a philosophy of optimistic activism, namely, a philosophy of hope understood materially, dealing -according to him -with the most important part of history; the future which has not yet come into being. Therefore, the philosophy of Educated Hope (docta-spes) stands in the Front of the world-process 10 . Educated Hope is a Theory-Praxis which does not transcend the conception of real things, inasmuch as this very conception illustrates reality itself as the horizontal reality 11 , the reality of the Not-Yet, as a world of real hope. The new philosophy that Bloch is founding, the philosophy of hope, transcends the anamnesis which characterizes the history of philosophy until Marx. "In bourgeois Society," Marx and Engels write in the Communist Manifesto, "The past rules over the present, in communist society the present rules over the past."
12 And Bloch adds: "and the present rules with the horizon within it, which is the horizon of the future." 13 With Marx, the philosophical balance leans from the past towards the present. Bloch understands the Marxian philosophy as the science of the future; as mediated with the concrete reality, which contains within it the real possibility -a science whose end is action 14 . This science does not remain within the sphere of theory, but is interwoven with praxis. This very science of the future is Theory-Praxis, or Hope. In his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx writes: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
15 Here (and in many other places in his thought) Marx opposes pure theory, which speculates about the world and itself, detaches from the subjects who act in the world. Here Marx is calling for adding theory to praxis, and vice versa. Theory and criticism are not substitutions for praxis: "the arms of criticism cannot replace the criticism of arms." 16 However, reality itself must also strive towards thought 17 . A theory without material power in reality, praxis without reflection -Marx takes both to be futile, as incomplete powers that will not succeed in the "project" of changing the world. Theory needs praxis in order to be able to actualize (here Marx qualifies and remarks that only the radical theory, one who touches the root of the matter, namely, man himself, will hold the masses) and at the same time, praxis needs theory as a guiding force for its fulfillment.
In opposition to some interpreters of Marx, Bloch does not understand him as calling for the cancellation of philosophy; he does contrast knowledge with change, but rather asks to conceive the two as complementary parts of the same whole. Marx, Bloch claims, does not relinquish philosophy, but the philosophy Marxism needs is a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy which will be theory-praxis; an active philosophy seeking to change the world. Marxism without philosophy cannot bring change in its true sense, because only change interwoven with object suited knowledge may lead to the kingdom of freedom, to the new. Therefore, a philosophical change is a change which is undertaken according to the analysis of the conditions of the situation, according to the objective tendencies and laws, and according to the real possibility 18 . But the philosophical change takes place for the most part in the horizon of the future. This is why it cannot be contemplated or interpreted (as philosophy has done to reality thus far), but it can be conceived by means of the theory-praxis or the philosophy of hope. The change occurs by virtue of the theory-praxis, from this composition of knowledge, hope and action. From now on it can be said: the new-future philosophy hopes, not (only) interprets.
Bloch is trying to establish a theory which opposes contemplation alone: "Philosophy will have conscience of tomorrow, commitment to the future, Knowledge of hope, or it will have no more knowledge."
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Knowledge detached from praxis in this sense is futile and is therefore no longer part of real knowledge. This knowledge is a component of hope, and the new philosophy is the knowledge of hope, since only educated hope necessitates the interweaving of theory and praxis. By definition, the future is undisclosed or unknown, but it opens up in front of us (at least in part) through the mediation of hope. Philosophy based on hope, philosophy aiming at fulfilling the future, is also a philosophy which is not detached from praxis. This is because hope cannot be regarded as such without the accompaniment of a proper praxis aiming at fulfilling it. Hope without praxis is nothing but an empty, fictitious thought, and as such is no longer to be regarded as hope. Praxis, therefore, is necessary for hope; without it, it is no longer what it is.
So far, I have presented hope as a hybrid concept which necessarily combines theoretical as well as practical features, and, as such, has affinity to both theory and praxis. In what follows I attempt to demonstrate shortly the relationship between hope as understood above, and the absurd as formulated in Camus' Myth of Sisyphus. I find it worthy to mention the concept of absurd, at this point, since like hope it founds a relation between theory and praxis, but at the same time it refuses to aim neither to hope nor to despair. If so, I will ask -what is it that differentiates hope from the absurd with regards to theory and praxis? I will try to answer this question by examining the concepts hope and absurd according to the model of practical reasoning. In arguments of practical reasoning, the assumptions are theoretical, while the conclusion points to an act. Practical reasoning establishes a strong affinity between the realm of thought and the realm of action; the prescription on an act follows from the theoretical assumptions just as the conclusion follows from the assumptions in ordinary theoretical reasoning.
Albert Camus characterized the absurd as the offspring of the encounter between the irrational -namely, the world -and the human striving for clarity and reason. The encounter of the irrationality (of the "world") and the human striving for rationality -which are in perpetual conflict -produces the absurd. The absurd, Camus writes, is not to be found in any of these two factors alone, but is a product of their encounter 20 . It is not in man or in the world, but arises out of their mutual, simultaneous presence. The absurd, in its essence, is an unbridgeable gap between human beings and the world, a gap caused by our own reason, which calls our attention to the conflict and the schism between us and the world 21 . So the absurd a crucial moment for man and can be counted as the first of his truths 22 . Any conclusion other than the absurd, Camus would say, is a distortion, "philosophical suicide", since it would be an evasion from the absurd, an evasion from the conclusion that our reason deduces in face of the world. Man has, therefore, two options: embrace the absurd or evade it. Therefore, I conclude from Camus, the absurd is the only true relation possible between reason and the world, and concerning our subject -between theory and praxis. If so, then any other relationship between theory and praxis is contingent, not real. In the Myth of Sisyphus, hope is understood as a sort of "solution" for the absurd, and insofar as it is a solution, it has no place in the worldview of the absurd. Any solution for the absurd should be regarded as an evasion from it, Camus argues. The absurd continues its existence only when it is nourished, in other words, when we clearly, consciously understand that one should relinquish any a priori meaning, any hope concerning our actions in the world. Only once we rid ourselves of the thought about hope, and simultaneously not delve into despair and give up action, can we properly provide for the absurd. The absurd is not the opposite of hope (since it is not desperation), but it has a mutually exclusive relationship with it: according to the Myth of Sisyphus, at least, Camus believes it impossible to experience absurd which contains hope. Hope is the inversion of the consciousness of death; it distances this knowledge from man and thus asks to infuse meaning to his life. But in face of death, life has no meaning, Camus says, and therefore hope is nothing but a false illusion that we should hurry and substitute in favor of the sober, conscious and rebellious vision of the absurd 23 . When asked why he regards "suicide" as the most important philosophical question, Camus replies: "If I ask myself how to judge that this question is more urgent than that, I reply that one judges by the action it entails." 24 From this it can be gathered that the importance of the question is determined by the actions which follow from it, or, in other words -the theory is assessed by the praxis it aims at. According to Camus, the question of suicide has three possible answers: its affirmation, its denial, and a third answer, upon which he focuses, that proposes to substitute the first two answers for the concept of the absurd.
The concept of absurd arises from the question of suicide. If indeed this question, as we have seen, is interwoven with praxis (since the answer to this question points to an act and demands an action), we can expect the absurd as well, as one of the implications of the very raising of the question, to be interwoven with praxis, to some extent. I will now show how this happens.
We have seen that the absurd is characterized on the one hand as self-awareness (awareness to the gap between me and the world, to my inability to rationally explain the world, and to the meaninglessness of everything) and as rebellion on the other (a rebellion against desperation). In other words, it is at the same time theory and praxis: there is no rebellion without consciousness, and the consciousness cannot be complete unless it produces rebellious activity. The question "Is this life worth living?" already assumes consciousness. Raising this question is like a pause in the automatic continuation of life, a pause in which life is not longer an activity which is preformed, but an object for our thought as well. Here, according to Camus, thought and the world are torn apart, a tear that both its preservation and its resolving (which is not really possible, according to Camus) demand some kind of praxis.
Camus points at three alternative means of action -one of which is faithful to the truth of the absurd, the other two are understood as evading it -desperation, hope and rebellion. Rebellion, Camus claims, is the only practical conclusion faithful to the absurd, since it is the only means for the preservation, over and over again, of the absurd. Desperation and hope are a practical distortion of this sole truth.
The absurd act in itself assumes awareness of the fact that the action of the absurd person will never produce the desired result, and therefore remains with itself, preserves itself. The absurd consciousness does not hope to attain by means of the actions resulting from it anything but the action itself. This is what infuses it with meaning. Any action undertaken for a different given end, Camus claims, destroys the absurd, and as a result, destroys the rebellion as its only practical and consistent conclusion. Would Sisyphus' suffering still be suffering, he wonders, "if at every step, the hope of succeeding upheld him?"
25
The absurd consciousness maintains a general meaninglessness, one which overcomes any possible hope. Why is it, then, that the man of the absurd, the carrier of the absurd consciousness, continues to act and live as if he is hoping, as if his actions carry meaning? Does he not contradict by this his consciousness? To this Camus would reply that the very contradiction between theory and praxis is itself the realization of the absurd. In other words, when the man of absurd acts, aware of the futility of his actions, he acts absurdly and thus maintains the absurd. If other practical conclusions were deduced from the absurd consciousness, the absurd would have been annulled.
The concept of the absurd, like the concept of hope, constitutes a relationship between theory and praxis, but the practical reasoning of the absurd shows that the practical conclusion contradicts the theoretical assumptions.
After characterizing the main properties of the concept of absurd, I will now return shortly to discuss the structure of the practical reasoning concerning the concept of hope, in comparison with that concerning the absurd. The practical reasoning of hope entails theoretical assumptions which are "hopeful" and a practical conclusion which is derived from and corresponds with these theoretical assumptions.
When comparing between absurd and hope, we have the following results: even though the theoretical assumptions of these two concepts are contradictory or at least mutually exclusive (being the theoretical assumptions of the absurd as those of despair), both share the same practical conclusion. In other words, if we assess the man of the absurd solely with reference to his actions, he would not seem any different than the man of hope. Hence, practically speaking, hope and the absurd are identical. The difference between them is limited to the opposition between their theoretical assumptions. An inquiry into the practical reasoning of the absurd reveals that the practical conclusion does not fulfill its theoretical assumptions, but their opposites.
Towards the end of The Principle of Hope, Bloch quotes Thomas Wolfe attributing life as absurd. Wolfe depicts life as short, dark, and terrifying. This life is not worth living, but nevertheless, he does not find death to be the answer to it. On the contrary, when death arrives, man struggles and protests against it with all his powers, until his last pulse 26 . Bloch emphatically rejects Wolfe's approach. He suggests Hope instead: "the wish builds up and creates the real, we alone are the gardeners of the most mysterious tree, which must grow."
27 Human life, accordingly, is a human creation. The wish or the subjective hope functions as a map that directs us towards a better future, which we alone (with accordance with the objective-real possibility) are its constituters. It is not enough to act as if hoping (like the men of the absurd), just as it is not enough to hope without acting towards the fulfillment of our hopes. The wish itself, the expectation, the conscious hope, is a basic feature of human consciousness, says Bloch, and as such has the power to motivate us into action. He who gives up his whishes, dreams, hopes, wouldn't be able to act in accordance with those wishes (since he lacks all wishes). Bloch writes: "hopelessness is itself, in a temporal and factual sense, the most insupportable thing, downright intolerable to human needs." 28 What is it, then, that motivates the man of the absurd to act (not simply as the man of despair, but as the man of hope)? My answer points at hope.
I have shown that the absurd constitutes a necessary affinity between theory and praxis; in addition to the theoretical standpoint it produces, it is also praxis. But the praxis of the absurd does not accord with its theoretical assumptions, insofar as it is not the fulfillment of the theoretical assumptions from which their praxis should be derived. Therefore, only hope (or stances which contain hope in their theoretical assumptions) maintains a relation where the practical conclusion follows from the theoretical assumptions; only by means of hope can theory be fulfilled in praxis. Hope is the link between theory and praxis or between praxis and theory.
To sum up the course of this paper's arguments, I will note, that only hope -being a mediator between theory and practice, insofar as it is educated hope, and insofar as it mediates the real-objective possibilities embedded in the reality of the presence, has within its powers to oppose the given state of things, the human distress, suffering and privation, and to lead the hoping man into a different, better future. This hope -which grasps and understands the present and the possibilities it entails, which always strives to a new and better future yet to become, which motivates hoping human beings to act towards establishing a better future, also by means of rejecting the fear which hinders us -can be understood as a "venture beyond", as a power that motivates us to transcend the given state of affairs.
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